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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
VIRGIL L. WOOD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
- vs -
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Brief of Respondent 
Case No. 
10471 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Virgil Wood, appeals from a 
Judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah denying the appellant's petition for 
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds: (1) appellant's 
petition was res judicata, and (2) the appellant is 
serving a concurrent sentence for robbery which 
\1'Ta;.: unassailed by the present petition and the ap-
pellant's present complaint was improper. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appelant filed a petition for writ of habeas 
,,.~,rµus on various grounds on September 9, 1965. 
2 
An answer and amended answer were filed, and 
on October 5, 1965, Judge A. H. Ellett denied the 
appellant's petition based upon previously filed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Respond-
ent filed a motion to dismiss this appeal which was 
denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the decision of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant filed a complaint for a writ of 
habeas corpus seeking release from the Warden ol 
the Utah State Prison (R. 1). He stated that he was il-
legally detained on conviction of the crimes of 
grand larcency and robbery. The record shows his 
conviction was to run concurrently with convictions 
for crimes for which he was then serving in the 
Utah State Prison (R. 2). An answer was filed by the 
Warden, and then an amended answer denying 
that appellant was entitled to consideration on 
habeas corpus because he was concurrently serv· 
ing a sentence for the same crimes (R. 23). The trial 
court at the time of hearing denied the petition for 
habeas corpus on the grounds that the appellant 
was serving a concurrent sentence for the same 
crime which he was not attacking, and his petitior. ' 
was barred because he hadn't raised the matter on 
a previous petition for habeas corpus attacking hi:. 




THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT SINCE 
APPELLANT WAS SERVING A CONCURRENT SEN-
TENCE FOR THE SAME CRIME WHICH WAS UN-
ASSAILED, NO BASIS EXISTED FOR HABEAS 
CORPUS. 
The issue contended for by the appellant is 
that the trial court erred in not allowing appellant 
to collaterally attack his robbery conviction because 
he was serving a concurrent sentence for robbery. 
Both sentences were from five years to life; U:ah 
Cride Ann.§§ 71-51-1, -2 (1961). 
It is submitted that the decision in Wilkinson v. 
Harris, 109 Utah 76, 163 P.2d 1023 (1945) contrcls 
this case. In that case the appellant was con-
victed of burglary and grand larcency and sen-
tenced to indeterminate terms of imprisonment. Ap-
pellant challenged the sentence for both crimes. 
The court ruled that appellant was validly held on 
at least one charge and hence it need not consider 
the validity of his contention. The court observed, 
109 Utah at 77, 163 P.2d at 1023: 
The court had jurisdiction of the subject matter 
and the conviction for one of such offenses charged 
was valid. Appellant has not yet served his sentence 
on either conviction, and so we need not determine 
here whether the court exceeded its jurisdiction in 
sentencing him for two offenses. Until appellant has 
served his sentence on one conviction he is not en-
titled to a discharge on a writ of habeas corpus. 
serving a valid robbery conviction unassailed in the 
In the instant case the appellant is concurrently 
4 
present action. Therefore, under the rule in the 
Wilkinson case habeas corpus will not lie to con-
sider the other conviction. The appellant requests 
the court to abandon the Wilkinson rule and adopt 
a position allowing habeas corpus attacks on other 
convictions even though the appellant is still serv 
ing a valid sentence. Appellant contends Conners v. 
Pratt, 38 Utah 258, 112 Pac. 399 (1910) so ruled and 
should be reinstated as good precedent. It is sub-
mitted that that case does not support the appellan'.'s 
position, and since Wilkinson was a later case de 
cided under the "indeterminate sentence" law and 
more in tune with the present day prolific use of th8 
writ, the trial court's decision should be left un-
disturbed. 
The Connors case presented a situation where 
appellant was held on a first degree murder con-
viction and a subsequent burglary conviction. The 
first degree murder conviction was concededly de-
fective. The court agreed it could send the appellant 
back to the Warden's custody. However, the cour'. 
did not do so because the life sentence precluderl 
consideration by the Board of Pardons of a reduceci 
sentence which would have entitled the appel1~n1 
to release. Thus, the court stated, 38 Utah at 261, 112 
Pac. at 399: 
In view of this anomalous situation, in so far 8' 
plaintiff is concerned, and in view of the fact that. 
although the life sentence may be void, the sta~e ma\ 
nevertheless prosecute the plaintiff for the cnme. 0; 
murder in case it be determined that h~ ~as. tne'.f 
for that crime in a court having no junsd1ctJOn. ' 
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seems to us that justice requires that we at this time 
pass upon the legality of the first commitment, so 
that in the event that it should be declared void the 
plaintiff may timely and in a proper manner present 
the question of the reduction of the ten-year sentence 
under which he is now held and which would b~ 
terminated if the board of pardons reduced that sen-
tence for the maximum period of time fixed by the 
statute ... 
The situation was unusual and not the same 
as the instant one, because even assuming the in-
validity of the one sentence, appellant is still validly 
held on the other. Also, there is no impediment to 
his s'2eking timely release by the Board of Pardons 
as was apparently the case in Connors. The Wilkin-
son rule should remain inviolate. The flood of 
habeas corpus petitions requires some reasonabk? 
limitation and the Wilkinson rule appears more in 
harmony with the majority of jurisdictions including 
the Federal Courts in the Tenth Circuit and the 
United States Supreme Court. 
In McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934), the United 
States Supreme Court took a position comparable to 
lhe Wilkinson case of this court. It ruled that habeas 
corpus, as referred to in the Federal statute, meant 
the common-law writ with its powers and limitation2. 
The court ruled that the writ was available only to 
test "the lawfulness of the detention" and would not 
lie where the prisoner is "serving a part of his sen-
lence not assailed as invalid." Thus, the appellant 
herein, serving a valid sentence which runs con-
currently with the sentence he challenges, is net 
cmtitled to relief by habeas corpus. 
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In Browning v. Crouse. 327 F.2d 529 OOth Cir-
1964), the court was faced with a case similar lo 
the instant case. The appellant therein was convict-
ed of several robbery counts and was sentenced 
thereon. He was also convicted of being an habitual 
offender and was sentenced thereon. The appellant 
assailed the habitual criminal conviction on the 
grounds that he did not have counsel, nor was he 
advised of his rights to counsel at the time of his 
previous convictions that constituted his habitual 
criminal status. The court ruled it need not consider 
the issue, since appellant was otherwise serving a 
concurrent term for robbery. The court observed, 
in affirming the trial court's denial of habeas cori)lli, 
relief, 327 F.2d at 530: 
The first point raised is that the liie sentence as 
an habitual criminal is void because the two prior 
felony convictions, on which the habitual criminal in-
carceration is based, were violative of appellant's 
constitutional rights because he was not advised of 
his right to, or permitted to have, the assistance of 
counsel. The trial court found that in the first of 
these, a 1943 Missouri conviction when appellant was 
17 years of age, he was neither furnished counsel nor 
advised of his constitutional rights. The court also 
found that in the second, a 1950 Oklahoma convic· 
tion, he was advised of his consitutional right to be 
represented by counsel and did not request counsel. 
We need not concern ourselves at this time with 
the validity of either the Missouri or Oklahoma con-
victions. On three counts charging robbery, appcl~ 
lant was sentenced January 2, 1957, to concurren 
15-year terms. The trial court found tha~ under thJ. 
'Rules and Regulations of the Kansas Prison Boai 
h. ntence appellant could not be released from t is se 
7 
until he has served at least eight years and eleven 
months. The finding is not contested. 
McNally v. Hill, Warden, 293 U.S. 131, 135, 55 
S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238, holds that when the detention 
of a habeas petitioner is lawful under the sentence 
on one count, there is no occasion for inquiry into the 
validity of his conviction under another count. Al-
though McNally concerned a federal prisoner, the 
rule is applicable to federal habeas proceedings for 
the release of a prisoner held under a state judgment 
because the federal courts have no greater habeas 
powers when considering the applications of state 
prisoners. The present detention under the sentence 
on the robbery counts is valid. The sentence as an 
habitual criminal is separable. To review the habitual 
criminal sentence at this time would depart from 
the consistent federal practice of refusing to review 
habeas corpus questions which do not concern the 
lawfulness of the detention. 
The above case is clear precedent for the trial 
court's action in this case, and it is in accord with a 
long line of unbroken decisions from the Tenth Cir-
cuit. McMahan v. Hunter, 150 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 
1945); Reger v. Hudspeth, 103 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 
1939); McGann v. Taylor, 289 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1961); 
Crawford v. Taylor, 290 F.2d 197 (10th Cir. 1961); Hol-
loway v. Looney, 207 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1953); Wood 
v. Crouse, 327 F.2d 81 (10th Cir. 1964). 
In Clark v. Turner, 350 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1965), 
the court refused to inquire into appellant's deten-
tion at the Utah State Prison on a conviction where 
he was otherwise validly held on another count, cit-
ing both Browning and McNally. 
Numerous decisions from other federal courts 
support the rule. Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th 
8 
Cir. 1965); Miller v. Gladden, 341 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 
1952); Oughton v. U.S., 215 F.2d 578 (9th Cir., 19541· 
Sink v. Cox, 142 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1944); U.S. ex r~l'. 
Rinaldi v. New Jersey. 321 F.2d 885 (3rd Cir. 1963); 
It is submitted that this position is based on a realistic 
appraisal of the purposes of habeas corpus. Further 
various state courts, indeed the majority, also follo~ 
the same rule. Moore v. Hand. 187 Kan. 260, 356 P.2d 
809 (1960); Application of Current, 76 Nev. 41, 348 
P.2d 470 (1960); Burleaigh v. Raines, 359 P.2d 340 
(Okla. Crim. App. 196]); Ex parte Mooney, 26 Wash. 
2d 243, 173 P.2d 655 (1946); Petition of Wagner, 145 
Mont. 101, 399 P.2d 761 (1965); Goodman v. State, 
96 Ariz. 139, 393 P .2d 148 (1964). 
It is, of course, recognized that some courts have 
taken a contrary view. However, a reading of many 
of these cases shows a local necessity or special 
need. None is here present and the Wilkinson rule 
should continue. 
The trial court correctly denied the application 
for habeas corpus. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE AP· 
PLICATION FOR A WRIT OR HABEAS CORPUS BE· 
CAUSE OF RES JUDICATA. 
The trial court made a finding of fact (R. 26): 
1. That the petitioner, Virgil L. Wood, has 
heretofore filed petitions for Writ of Habeas qorpus, 
seeking review of his convictions and has fa~]ed te 
raise in either of those petitions, the items raised m 
the instant petition. 
9 
The doctrine of res judicata has been recog-
nized as applicable to habeas corpus matters in 
Utah. Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 388 P.2d 
412 (1964). It is the rule in Utah that where a party 
brings a suit and fails to raise a basis for relief where 
the opportunity presents itself a subsequent action 
seeking to adjudicate such an issue will be deemed 
barred. Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d 
946 (1962); East Mill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake 
City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863 (1945). 
Since appellant could have raised the same is-
sues in the previous actions the matter is now 
barred. 
- CONCLUSION -
The action of the trial court was based on sound 
Utah precedent and policy. There is no reasoned 
basis for abandoning the Wilkinson doctrine. It is 
submitted that this court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General, 
State of Utah 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
